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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
-vJOHN HENRY MAURER

CASE NO. 860006

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against John Henry Maurer
for Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a First Degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1953 as amended).
A jury found Mr. Maurer guilty following a trial which lasted from
November 12 through November 15, 1985, in the Third District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Philip
Fishier, Judge, presiding.

R.

On November 18, 1985, Mr. Maurer was

sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to life in the
Utah State Prison. (R.246).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Maurer met Janet Hannan in 1984, and began to develop a
relationship with her that eventually stabilized when they moved
into a condominium together in June of 1984. (T.91,110).

John was work

at Sperry Univac, and as a recovered alcoholic, had been free from
the use of controlled substances for several years* (T.108,109).
His good friend, Mike Bickley, was also an alcoholic, and they had
developed a close relationship over a several year period* (T.109,110).

In October of 1984, Janet and John became engaged to be
married. (T.110).
months.

Things went along smoothly for the next few

John was re-establishing contact with his family in

New York from whom he'd been ostracized for some time as a result
of his "black sheep" lifestyle. (T.270).
In January of 1985, things turned sour. At the Superbowl
game at Mike Bickley's house, Mike suggested a three-way sexual
affair between he, Janet and John, and John became very angry and
left. (T.112).

The next day Mike and Janet began a sexual affair

behind John's back. (T.113).
On January 30, John received a call from Janet at work. (T.93).
She told him the engagement was off and not to bother to come
home. (T.93).

John immediately came home to talk to Janet, and he

was visibly upset. (T.93).

Janet's parents were at the condominium

(they were in town on a ski vacation), so John asked to talk to her
privately. (T.93,114).

They went outside where Janet told John that

the relationship was over and that he should return the following
morning to remove his belongings.
John left the condominium in a state of emotional turmoil and
called a suicide hotline.
(T.226).

He was referred to St. Mark's Hospital.

At the hospital he spoke with doctors and was diagnosed as

suffering from "acute situational anxiety and grief reaction".
(T.228).

He also called his mother and asked her to call Janet at

the condominium the next morning to try to patch things up. (T.235) .
The doctor gave him some Valium and allowed him to leave with a
friend, Ed Gutierrez. (T.228,119).
Ed and John went to Ed's apartment where they talked for about
three hours. (T.236).

John was crying, very depressed, and "down

on himself". (T.236).

He slept for two or three hours and then in

the morning left Ed's to return to the condominium where he was

supposed to meet Janet and move his things out. (T.238).

On the

way he again stopped at the hospital to get some Valium. (T.269).
Janet and Mike arrived soon after John at the condominium.
(T.90,94).

John asked Mike to leave for a period of time so he

could speak to Janet. (T.95).

Janet was staunch in her decision to

break off the relationship and began to move John's clothing out of
the bedroom.
Janet.

At one point, John's mother called and spoke with

John perceived from Janet's end of the conversation that

his mother sided with Janet. (T.271).

Shortly thereafter Mike

returned. (T.97).
John was pacing from the kitchen to the living room to the
bedroom, alternating between being very upset and very calm. (T.97,119)
He was crying, and then at one point hugged Janet and Mike and
told Janet she deserved someone better than him. (T.120).

He

asked Mike, "don't you feel guilty about this?" (T.120).

Mike

said yes, he felt guilty enough so that the first time he and
Janet had sex he couldn't "get it up." (T.122).

At this point

despair turned to rage, and John suddenly went to the kitchen,
grabbed a knife, and went into the bedroom where Janet was removing
his clothes and stabbed her in the back. (T.122).
John fought with Mike when he tried to summon help. (T.100).
Janet died shortly thereafter.

After the stabbing, Mike said

John had a "strange smile" on his face (T.102), and the paramedics
used the following words to describe John's affect; "laughing" (T.152),
more or less "pleased" (T.158), "smart-aleck grin" (T.163), "cold
mean stare" (T.164), and "he had a crazed look in his eyes, as if
he had seen a ghost." (T.165).
At trial, Dr. Mercedes Reisinger, a psychologist, and
Dr. Alan Jeppsen, a psychiatrist, testified that in their opinions,
Mr. Maurer was acting under the influence of extreme mental or

emotional disturbance at the time he killed Janet. (T.301,317).
Dr. Jeppsen testified that, from Mr. Maurer's perspective, every
significant person in his life had rejected him—his fiance

and

her family, his friend, and his mother, in siding with Janet.
(T.271).

He said such a sequence of events was very shattering

for Mr. Maurer. (T.271).

Dr. Lincoln Clark, a psychiatrist for

the State, testified that Mr. Maurer had been emotionally hurt by
Janet's rejection, and that what happened was an account of very
basic human emotion (anger, jealousy) in a crisis situation.
(T.467,468).
The jury convicted Mr. Maurer of Second Degree Murder on
November 15, 1985. (R.241).

He was sentenced to the indeterminate

period of five years to life in the Utah State Prison on
November 18, 1985. (R.246).

From that judgment and conviction

this appeal is taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting
into evidence a letter written by Appellant more than a month after
the homicide, absent a showing that the letter had some probative
value which was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
The trial court erred in refusing to ask the jury panel
questions concerning important issues in Appellant's case so as to
allow Appellant to intelligently exercise his pre-emptory challenges.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
INTO EVIDENCE A LETTER WRITTEN BY
APPELLANT TO THE VICTIM'S FATHER
OVER A MONTH AFTER THE HOMICIDE.
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a Motion to preclude the State
from introducing into evidence a letter written by Mr. Maurer to

the victim's father, Mike Hannan. (R.38).

The letter was written

by Mr. Maurer on March 10, 1985, while he was awaiting trial in
the Salt Lake County Jail, nearly one and one-half months after
Janet Hannan was killed.

The letter expressed, among other things,

Mr. Maurer's satisfaction with killing the victim.

A copy of the

letter is attached as Addendum A.
The court denied Appellant's Motion in Limine on the basis
that the letter was probative of Mr. Maurer's state of mind at the
time of the homicide, and thus would assist the jury in determining
whether Mr. Maurer was guilty of Second Degree Murder or Manslaughter.
(Pre-trial Motion T.24).
Subsequently, Appellant petitioned the trial court for a
rehearing on the motion, and argument was heard November 12, just
prior to trial. (T.2).

Mr. Maurer again asserted that a fair

application of Rules 803 and 403 of the Rules of Evidence
prohibited the introduction of the letter into evidence. (T.3).
Appellant conceded that the letter was technically admissible as
nonhearsay under U.R.E. 801(d) (2), (Admission by Party Opponent),
but argued that there was no material issue as to who killed
Janet Hannan. (T.4).

Appellant was prepared to stipulate that he,

in fact, intentionally caused Ms. Hannan's death. (T.4).

Nor was

there any material issue with respect to the manner, time, and
place of death.

The only issue to be addressed by the trier of

fact was whether Mr. Maurer was acting under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse.
Defense Counsel further argued that the letter was not
admissible as evidence of Mr. Maurer's state of mind at the time

the homicide occurred. (T.5).

Mr. Maurer claimed that the letter

was written at a time too remote to reflect accurately on whether
he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he killed
the victim. (T.6).

Finally, Mr. Maurer argued that even if the

letter had some relevance on the issue of state of mind, the
prejudicial effect of the letter far exceeded its potential
relevance under U.R.E. 403 (See, generally, T.6-8).
The State responded, first, that the letter was admissible as
an admission, and second, that the letter was being offered to
corroborate the State's view that Mr. Maurer intentionally killed
the victim without any justification or mitigation. (T.12).

On

the issue of prejudice, the prosecutor argued that all evidence
introduced by the State is designed to '^prejudicd1 the defendant. (T.12) .
The court subsequently denied the motion to exclude the
letter.

Noting that the issue revolved around whether Mr. Maurer

was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
at the time of the crime, the court concluded that, "the probative
value of the letter goes to the state of the mind of the defendant...
on the date the offense allegedly occurred." (T.63).

The court

further found that the "probative value is not outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, nor is there
any chance of misleading the jury..." (T.63).

The letter was

subsequently admitted into evidence over Appellant's objection. (T.219).
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting
the letter into evidence.

It had little or no relevance to the

only disputed issue in the case, and any potential relevance it
may have had was substantially outweighed by the danger that it
unfairly prejudiced Mr. Maurer.
-6-

A.

THE LETTER WAS NOT RELEVANT TO
APPELLANT'S STATE OF MIND AT
THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF
THE OFFENSE.

Evidence is "relevant" if it has any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence.

The

"facts of consequence" in this case are limited to Mr. Maurer's
state of mind on January 31, 1985. Therefore, for the letter to
be relevant, it must tend to make the existence of Mr. Maurer's
"extreme mental or emotional disturbance" less likely.

A review

of the caselaw provides nothing on point since it is apparent
that no cases exist which present an identical factual scenario.
Nevertheless, some helpful guidelines emerge which can be applied
to Mr. Maurer's issue by analogy.

In State v. Marlar, 498 P2d 1276 (Id. 1972) , defendant was
charged with Assault with a Deadly Weapon.

He had observed a

fellow employee sitting with his wife in her car, where they
were conversing and possibly embracing.

Defendant rammed her car

with his pick-up truck, and then when the man got out of the car,
defendant allegedly swore at him and hit him in the head with a
gun.

At trial, the state sought to introduce a subsequent telephone

conversation wherein defendant, among other things, told the
victim "he would put him in the morgue." Id., at 1280. The state
argued that the statements by the defendant were relevant to his

-7-

state of mind at the time of the assault.

The court noted that

prior threats may be admissible, as they comprise "part of the
mosaic of the criminal event," but that statements subsequent to
the event are not normally an integral part of the event unless
they "indicate a state of mind or an intent existing at the time
of the commission of the offense." Id., at 1282.
Holding that the statement was inadmissible, the court
said

that the statement ("I'll put you in the morgue") did not

tend to establish state of mind at the time of the alleged crime.
The court observed that "the statement, at most, was an opprobrious
remark illustrating the caller's malevolent attitude toward the
witness Higgins at the time the statement was made." Id., at 1283.
The court concluded by stating that even if it could glean some
probative value from the statement, it would be so slight that
admission of the statement into evidence would be unjustifiably
prejudicial.
In State v. Sempsrott, 587 SW.2d 630 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979),
defendant wrote a letter to the murder victim's sister seven
months after the murders.

In the letter defendant expressed

remorse for his deed and said he was unable to explain what
happened the night of the homicide.

He offered the letter at

The state also argued that the statement, along with other
statements allegedly made in an effort to get the charges
dismissed, were implied admissions of guilt or showed consciousness
of a weak case. The court rejected that argument, but recognized
the general rule that evidence which tends to show the accused has
either attempted to fabricate or procure false evidence or suppress
incriminating evidence is relevant and admissible against him or
her. Id., at 1283.
-8-

trial to help prove his state of mind at the time of the incident.
The court found that the letter was inadmissible because it was
self serving and not part of the "res gestae."

The court

observed that in order for the statements to be admissible, they
must be the "apparently spontaneous result of the occurrence
operating upon [the defendant's] perceptive senses." Id., at 634.
The court further noted that "declarations that are the product
of reasoning from collateral facts are not part of the res gestae,"
citing State v. O'Neal, 436 SW2d 241, 144 (Mo. 1968).

Where the

murders and the statements did not form "one continuous transaction,"
the court said, the statements were inadmissible.
In State v. Newman, 513 P2d 258 (Mont. 1973), defendant
appealed his conviction of involuntary manslaughter of his wife.
He argued on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting
statements allegedly made by his wife to two neighbors concerning
a beating defendant gave her.

The statements were made 12 to 13

hours after the alleged beating occurred.

The appellate court

agreed that they were inadmissible since they were not spontaneous
and substantially contemporaneous with the injury-causing event.
The court discussed the "res gestae" exception to the hearsay
rule, and its four modern components; 1)
2)

excited utterances,

declarations of present sense impressions, 3)

as to state of mind, and 4)

declarations

declarations as to body condition.

The rationale behind all of these exceptions, said the court, is
that the statements are contemporaneous with the event, therefore
lending a particular reliability or trustworthiness to them.
In People v. Northrop, 182 Cal Rptr. 197 (Cal Ct. App. 1982),
defendant was charged with murder and felony child abuse of her

young child, who had died from organ damage and bone injuries.
At trial, in support of her theory that her husband caused the
child's death, she offered testimony concerning two conversations
she had had with her mother and her husband which expressed fear
about her husband's tendency for violence and abuse.

These

conversations occurred in June and September of 1979 and the
victim's life was taken in December of the same year.

The court

denied her request because the conversations were too remote in
time to be sufficiently probative of
during the time in question.

her

state of mind

The court observed that to be

admissible, the evidence must have more than "slight relevancy"
to the issues presented, and must be of some "competent, substanti
and significant value," citing People v. Green, 609 P2d 468
(Cal Ct. App. 1980), 182 Cal Rptr, at 206.

In the context

of

these standards, the court concluded that the proffered evidence
"reflected only indirectly upon appellant's state of mind at a
remote time."

Id.

In the instant case, Mr. Maurer's letter to Mr. Hannan had no
relevancy to his state of mind at the time he committed the crime.
As in Marlar, supra, the statement at best illustrated Mr. Maurer'
"malevolent attitude" toward the victim's father when he wrote the
letter, not his emotional and mental state on January 31, 1985.
Most, if not all, of the comments in the letter were calculated to
hurt the father. (T.464).

The state didn't argue, at any time,

either in its rebuttal to the Motion in Limine, or its summation
to the jury, that Mr. Maurer killed the victim to hurt Mr. Hannan.
Thus, any connection between the letter and Appellant's state of
mind on January 31, 1985, was tenuous, at best.
-10-

Noteworthy of comment is the fact that neither the State nor
the trial court ever articulated how the letter tended to show
Mr. Maurer's state of mind at the time he killed the victim.
essential message of the letter was lack of remorse.

The

This lack of

remorse was demonstrated after 38 days of confinement under
circumstances where any number of factors could have influenced
Appellant's emotional state.

Lack of remorse exhibited over one

month after a homicide may be properly addressed in a sentencing
context, but such evidence has no tendency to prove Appellant's
mental state at the time of the offense.
Northrop, Newman, and Sempsrott, supra, stand firmly for the
proposition that statements regarding state of mind at the time of
an event which are made at a remote time are inherently unreliable.
John Maurer's letter is not an "apparently spontaneous result of
the occurrence [the homicide] operating upon [his] senses."
Sempsrott, at 634. Rather, the "declaration [is a] product of
reasoning from collateral facts...not part of the res gestae." Id.
The letter had no "competent, substantial, and significant value"
on the issue of whether John Maurer was operating under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse.

Northrop,at 206. The letter,

therefore, should have been excluded at trial, and it was error
for the court to refuse to do so.
B.

ANY RELEVANCE OF THE LETTER
WAS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED
BY ITS UNFAIR PREJUDICE TO
THE APPELLANT.

Even if the letter was relevant, the court erred in admitting
it into evidence where the relevance was substantially outweighed
-11-

by its prejudice to Mr, Maurer.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of

Evidence states that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
The court in United States v. Grassi, 602 F2d 1192 (Fifth
Circuit 1979) discussed the analysis underlying Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, which is identical to the corresponding Utah rule.
The court noted that 403 requires a determination by the trial
court of the relative probity and prejudice inherent in the
introduction of a particular piece of evidence.

The "probative

value" must be determined by evaluating first, the tendency of the
evidence to prove an issue of consequence, and second, the
proponent's need for the evidence.
cases cited therein.
next be examined.

See 602 F2d, at 1195, and

The potential for "unfair prejudice" must

Unfair prejudice, the court stated, does not

refer only to the fact that items of evidence will have adverse
effects on a party's case, since most evidence offered by an
opponent should have this effect. Id.

Rather, "unfair prejudice"

within this context means"an undue tendency to suggest [a] decision
on an improper basis, commonly, though
emotional one."

not necessarily, an

Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed

Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 403, at 102.
State v. Cloud, 722 P2d 750, (Utah 1986) addressed the issue
of admissibility of gruesome photographs in the context of a
Rule 403 argument by the defense.

In support of its charge of

Second Degree Murder, the State sought to admit photographs of the
-12-

deceased which depicted the victim's prone body, her multiple
wounds, and her finger extended in an "obscene gesture."

The

state argued that the photographs were relevant to show the
intentional nature of the attack.

Appellant objected, based on

his position that the cause and manner of death were undisputed, so
that the sole issue was whether or not Appellant killed while under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
In analyzing the evidence, this Court discussed whether the
evidence had "essential evidentiary value," that is, whether the
evidence was the best available means of conveying the information,
and secondly, if it was, whether it was outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.

This Court reached the inescapable conclusion

that the pictures had no essential evidentiary value since what
they portrayed was conveyed to the jury via nonprejudicial means.
Moreover, the photographs were not relevant to rebut the defense's
theory of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

The only likely

use of the photographs was for an improper purpose, to inflame the
jury.

The court thus held the admission of the photographs to be

reversible error.
Rule 403 also allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence
on the grounds that it confuses the issues or misleads the jury.
In State v. Miller, 709 P2d 350 (Utah 1985) , the court excluded
proffered psychiatric testimony by the defense on the grounds that
it would be speculative and confuse the jury.

Appellant sought

to admit testimony of a psychologist with expertise in sexual
abuse of children who would testify, inter alia, about typical
psychological profiles of sex offenders.

This Court affirmed

Appellant's conviction and agreed with the trial court that the
-13-

admission of such evidence would shift the focus from whether
Appellant had committed the crime to whether Appellant fit the
psychological profile of a sex offender.

Similarly, in Pearce v.

Wistisen, 701 P2d 489 (Utah 1985) , this court held in a wrongful
death action, that the admission of evidence concerning defendant's
behavior the night before the accident tended to improperly shift
the focus of the lawsuit.

In Pearce, the decedent was killed in a

boating accident, and the defendant sought to show that decedent's
alcohol consumption the night before contributed to his fate. This
court disagreed, observing that the inquiry should have focused on
decedent's actions surrounding the accident rather than his
consumption of alcohol the night before and related "character
evidence."
An application of the Rule 403 principles discussed above
mandates exclusion of the letter in the instant case.

The letter

had no "essential evidentiary value," like the photographs in
Cloud, supra.

Moreover, it created a risk of unduly prejudicing

the Appellant as well as misleading and confusing the jury.

Cloud,

Miller, and Pearce, supra.
The sole issue before the jury was whether Mr. Maurer acted
under extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he killed Janet
Hannan.

Even if the letter was relevant to the issue of Mr. Maurer's

state of mind, it was not the only available means of presenting
state of mind evidence to the jury.

The prosecution did not "need"

the evidence, since ample evidence of Mr. Maurer's conduct and
statements was presented through Mr. Bickley, Mr. Hannan, Mr. Gutierrezi
several EMT's, and testimony of two psychiatrists and one psychologist.
Their testimony concentrated on the most reliable evidence regarding
Mr. Maurer's emotional state, evidence contemporaneous with the
-14-

offense itself.

The letter, therefore, lacked "essential

evidentiary value."
The letter carried with it an extreme danger of "unfair
prejudice."

It suggested a decision on an emotional, and thus

improper basis.

The State was keenly aware of the impact such an

offensive document would have on a jury.

Mr. Maurer's vituperative

and revengeful comments chill even the most casual observer.

The

admission of this letter into evidence was tantamount to a directed
verdict for the State.

The prosecutor effectively used the letter

to inflame the jury against Mr. Maurer.

In his opening statement,

he referred to the letter as an "especially crucial piece of
evidence." (T.78).

In his closing argument, he said the letter

referred to the victim in "terms disgusting for human beings," (T.486)
and that the letter blamed others for the killing while showing no
remorse. (T.486).

By the use of the letter, the prosecutor shifted

the jury's attention away from the operative facts of the offense
to a gruesome picture of a vituperative man undeserving of any
mitigation under the law.
The letter should also have been excluded since any probative
value it had was substantially outweighed by the danger it confused
the issues and misled the jury.

The letter and potential reasons

for its production became a focus of the trial.

In an effort to

explain its relationship to Mr. Maurer's state of mind at the time
of the offense, the defense was forced to present psychiatric
evidence of Mr. Maurer's mental illness at the time he wrote the
letter.

Dr. Reisinger testified that Mr. Maurer's "reality testing"

was limited and because of his pathology, he was unable to face his
pain and guilt. (T.321,340).

As a result, he continued to "devalue"

the victim in order to justify his behavior. (T.321).

Without

that defense mechanism, he would have been at risk for suicide•
(T.321).

Dr. Jeppsen agreed, (T.276) and further testified that

the letter may have been a mechanism to effectuate a death wish
or assure John's punishment.

Dr. Jeppsen also said it could be

viewed as a possible cry for help, so that others would see the
extent of his pathology. (T.276).
All of this was absolutely irrelevant to the central issue in
the case; namely, whether, at the time of the homicide, a reasonable
person in Mr. Maurer's shoes would have been influenced by extreme
mental or emotional disturbance.

On one hand the jury was asked

to focus on the operative events in John's life as they contributed
to his crime from an objective standpoint, and on the other, they
were asked to focus on his psychiatric illness and its relationship
to the letter from a subjective standpoint.

While the issues are

legally distinct, no jury could be expected to compartmentalize and
analyze them separately.

A court cannot be sure that evidence

concerning Appellant's mental illness didn't contaminate and
thereby eviscerate his defense under the manslaughter statute with
its objective standard.

The letter completely confused the issue

of Mr. Maurer's culpability at the time of the offense and it should
never have been admitted.
The trial court erred in admitting the letter into evidence
even if it had some relevance or probative value. The substantial
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and of it misleading
the jury warranted its exclusion.

State v. Pierre, 572 P2d 1338,

1352 (Utah 1977) mandates a reversal if "there exists a reasonable
probability or likelihood that there would have been a result more
favorable to the defendant in absence of the error."

Under this

standard, the trial court's ruling was reversible error.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO ASK QUESTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFENSE
COUNSEL DURING VOIR DIRE,
Voir dire examination generally consists of face-to-face
questioning of prospective jurors by counsel or the trial judge in
an effort to determine the juror's ability to decide a case fairly
and impartially.

Voir dire's recognized purpose is to detect

actual bias and to collect sufficient information to permit the
intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.

State v. Ball, 455

(Utah 1983); State v. Lockett, 1654 P.2d 433, 438 (Kansas 1982);
People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 873 (Cal. 1981).

Any rule of law

or any trial court ruling that denies a litigant the examination
of prospective jurors concerning their qualifications, in order to
enable the litigant to exercise peremptory challenges judiciously
and intelligently, deprives the party of a substantial right.
People v. Williams, supra at 876; State v. Ball, supra at 1060.
The sole issue is whether defense counsel, considering the totality
of the questions permitted, gained enough specific information to
intelligently exercise challenges for cause and enough general
information to exercise peremptory challenges.

Bolhouse v. State,

687 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1984).
In Utah, the trial judge normally has broad discretionary
power in the conduct of voir dire.

State v. Ball, supra at 1060;

State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56,60 (Utah 1982).

This discretion

is permitted to enable the trial court to accelerate the process
by prohibiting irrelevant inquiry, State v. Lockett, supra at 439;
to protect the privacy of the juror, State v. Ball, supra at 1060;
and to prevent conditioning of prospective jurors as to evidence
which will be heard at trial, People v. Williams, supra at 887.

The fact that the trial court is entitled to proceed with
voir dire is, however, not to say that a trial court should fail
to exercise the discretion conferred on it by state law.

While

there is no strict test, courts must generally allow considerable
latitude in the examination of jurors, State v. Lockett, supra at
438; State v. Camarillo, 678 P.2d 102, 104 (Idaho App. 1984), thus
granting the accused every reasonable protection.
611 P.2d 748,750 (Wash. 1980).

State v. Herman,

Expedition should not be used at

the consequence of the quality of justice.

People v. Williams,

supra at 877.
In State v. Ball, supra, this court reversed a conviction for
driving under the influence of alcohol because the trial court
refused to allow defense counsel to question potential jurors,
who abstained from drinking alcohol, concerning any possible
religious basis for abstention.

In discussing the relevancy of

the question the court noted:
Of course it does not follow that the person who
abstains from alcohol for religious or moral
reasons will therefore necessarily be unable to
act as a fair and impartial juror in a trial for
driving under the influence of alcohol. It does,
however, follow that a defense attorney may,
from a similar analysis, conclude that one person
is generally less impartial than another. It is
to allow such decisions to be informed that a
party must be allowed to gather sufficient
relevant information during voir dire.
Id. at 1060.
In this case, Appellant submitted proposed questions to the
jury panel on voir dire (see Addendum B ) . Defense counsel wanted
to ask potential jurors whether they thought psychiatrists or
psychologists "have valuable insights into human behavior" (T.68),
and if the jurors would "be likely to disregard testimony" of
psychiatrists or psychologists (T.69).

The trial court refused to

ask these questions stating that these questions would be covered
in the final jury instructions. (T.69).

Counsel was also prohibited

from obtaining information about prior experience of the jurors in
stressful or volitile emotional relationships, and prior experience
with alcohol. (T.70).

As a result, Appellant was unable to gather

sufficient relevant information during voir dire to intelligently
exercise peremptory challenges or gain adequate information so as
to successfully challenge for cause.
deprived of a substantial right.

Mr. Maurer was thereby

People v. Williams, supra, at 876;

State v. Ball, supra at 1060.
The only issue in this case was the mental state of Mr. Maurer
at the time of the killing.

By not allowing defense counsel to

ask questions concerning the juror's views on psychology and
expert testimony, as well as their experience with volitile
emotional relationships, the trial court prevented counsel from
gaining information on this vital point of the case.

Appellant

urges this court to find that the voir dire, an essential proceeding
in a trial, was so flawed by the trial court's refusal to ask
proposed questions that it fatally tainted the trial.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant seeks
reversal of his conviction and remand of his case to the District
Court for dismissal of the charges and/or a new trial, or a
finding of guilty of Manslaughter,5L second degree felony.
Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 1986.

NANCY BERGESON
Attorney for Appellant
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four copies of the above Appellant's
Brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this <2^5> day of
November, 1986.
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M -£.

JCY BERGESON"
Attorney for Appellant

DELIVERED by

this

November, 1986.
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ADDENDUM A

3/10/85

To Mike Hannon,*
Just a letter to let you know that I'm glad I killed
Janet. uDaddyfs Little Girl11 is no more. You spoiled
her rotten. Thank Cod you were not there that morning.
You might have prevented it. I hope you feel guilt over
it.
It was a great feeling to watch her die. She kept
crying "It hurts, It hurts". I should hope so, I mean it
was a 13 inch kitchen knife. Hike Bickley got to watch her
die too. It was great.
Your daughter was nothing but a
whore, a fucking whore. Drifting from one man to another.
She couldn't break the engagement herself. No Daddy had to
demand that she make a decision. God she was 29 and couldn't
function or live without you doing everything for her.
So you had her buried in the Catholic section of the
Salt Lake Cemetary. After her having an abortion? You
fucking cover up artists, I hope her her death hurt you.
Or are you relieved? Uhat a stupid bitch she was. She did
everything in the relationship and I sat back and did very
little. I love it! She was so emotional and stupid. But
basically a real whore. \Jhat are you going to do now? Brin^
her back from the dead. You should have been there that
morning to prevent the murder. Hope you enjoyed your
skiing that day. The laughs on you.
The killer
John H. Maurer

-For legibility, this is a typed reproduction of the original
handwritten letter.

ADDENDUM B

JTAFES PPATFPAfr

Salt Lahe Legal Defender Assoc.
Attorneys for Defendant
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444

uY

K

(.Annie iQCxJ>
ft'

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
:

Plaintiff

v.

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
QUESTIONS TO THE JURY
PANEL ON VOIR DIRE

:

JOHN HENRY MAURER

:

Case No. CR-85-311

Defendant
The defendant, JOHN HENRY MAURER, by and through his
attorneys of record, NANCY BERGESON and JAMES BRADSHAW,
respectfully submit the following interrogatories for the voir
dire of the prospective jurors in the above numbered case.

QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY PANEL
1.

Where are you employed?

2.

What are your duties there?

3.

How long have you been so employed?

4«

Do you have any plans for a change of employment in

the near future?

If so:

Why do you plan to change your place of employment?
Where do you plan to change your employment to?

C*

tr*-«re is * cur spouse employed?

7.

Wh^t are his or her duties at that place of

employment?
8.

How long has your spouse been so employed?

9.

Does your spouse have any plans for a change in

employment?

If so:

Why does he (she) plan to make such a change?
Where does he (she) plan to change his (her) places of
employment to?
10.

Do you have any children?

If so:

State the age and sex of each of these children?
Which of these children reside with you?
Are any of these children employed?
If so, describe the nature and length of this employment.
Are any of these children married?
Which of these children are married?
11.

Do you have any grandchildren?

If so:

What are the ages and sex of each of these grandchildren?
Which of your children are parents?
12.

Do you belong to any clubs or organizations?

If so:

What clubs or organizations do you belong to?
Have you ever held any elected or leadership positions in
the club or organization?

If so:

What was the nature of that position:
-2-

13.

What are your hobbies and leisure time activities?

14.

What do you rely on for your sources of information,

i.e., newspapers, magazinesf television, radio, or word of mouth?
15.
newspapers):

Do you subscribe to any publications (including
If so:

What are the publications that you subscribe to?
Do you read these publications regularly?
16.

Have you lived in any place other than Salt Lake

County for any length of time?

If so:

How long have you lived in Salt Lake County?
Where did you live before you came here?
Why did you decide to move to Salt Lake County?
17.

Is there anything else that you feel that we should

know about you?
18.

Are there any of you who have ever studied law?

If

so:
Where?
When?
Did you specialize in any particular area of law?
Did you graduate?
If you are currently practicing law, what is the nature
of your practice?
Would this prevent you in any way in following the
instructions on the law as given to you by this court?
-3-

19.

Co any cf ]cu have any close n c n u s

are lawyers or law students?

«»«. •» ^=.^ «»*_*> «^.» — ..w

If so:

What is the name of that friend or relative?
Where does he or she practice law or go to school?
What is the nature of his or her practice?
Would that prevent you in any way from following the
instructions on the law as given to you by the court?
20.

Do any of you know the prosecutors, Mr. Morgan or

Mr. MacDougal?
21.

Do any of you know any of the State's witnesses?

22.

Do any of you know the alleged victim of this

offense, or any members of her family?
23.

Do any of you know the defendant, JOHN HENRY MAURER,

or any member of his immediate family?
24.

Have you ever heard of JOHN HENRY MAURER in any

context other than may relate to this case?
25.

Do any of you know Mr. Maurer's attorneys, Nancy

Bergeson and James Bradshaw?
26.
Univac Corp.?

Do any of you know anyone who works for Sperry
If so, who, and what is the nature of the

relationship?
27.

Do any of you know anything about the facts of this

case other than what you have heard in court today?

If so:

Have you read stories about this case in the newspapers
or heard about it over the radio or television?
-4-
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Have you discussed the case with someone who claimed to

know something about the facts of the case?
28.

Have any of you ever been employed by the Salt Lake

County Attorney's Office or any law enforcement agency?

If so:

What was the nature of that employment?
What were your duties?
When were you so employed?
Would that experience affect in any way your ability to
serve on this jury in a fair and impartial manner?
29.

Do any of you have close friends or relatives who

have been employed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office or
any law enforcement agency?
If so, name the friend or relation and the agency he or
she worked for.
30.

Would this relationship in any way affect your

ability to sit on this jury in a fair and impartial manner?
31.

Are there any of you who would tend to give more

credibility or weight to the testimony of a police officerf merely
because he or she is a police officerr than you would to any other
witness?
32.

If the defendant were to testify, would you give his

testimony the same weight and credit that you would give to any
other witness?
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33.

Ha% e any of ycu ever

served on a jury b e f o r e ?

X€

so:

What type of case was it?
When was the trial?
Were you the foreman?
What was the verdict?
Would that experience affect your ability to serve this
jury in a fair and impartial manner?
\/ 34. Have any of you ever been called as a witness
before?

If so:
What type of case was it?
What was the nature of your testimony?
When was the trial or hearing?
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on

this jury in a fair and impartial manner?
35.

Have any of you or your close friends or relatives

ever been the victim of a criminal offense?

If so:

What was the nature of the offense?
Was anybody charged, arrested or convicted of that
offense?
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on
this jury in a fair and impartial manner?
36.

Have any of you or your close friends or relatives

ever been accused of a crime before?

If so:

What was the nature of the charge?
-6-
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?i*ould that experience affect your ability to serve on
this jury in a fair and impartial manner?
37•

How do you feel the courts have dealt with the

rights of persons accused of crimes versus the rights of the
people in society?
38.

What are your feelings about someone accused of

39.

Would any of you prefer, for any reason, not to sit

murder?

on this case?
If so, why do you not want to sit on this jury?
40.

Are there any of you who are not in such a fair and

impartial state of mind that you would not be satisfied to have a
juror possessing your mental state judge the evidence if you or
your loved ones were on trial here?
41.

Does the mere fact that Mr. Maurer is charged with

this offense in the Information cause any of you to believe that
he is probably guilty as charged?
42.

Do you now presume Mr. Maurer to be innocent of the

:rime as charged?
43.

Do any of you feel that Mr. Maurer has a burden to

>rove his innocence?
44.

Do you understand Mr. Maurer has no obligation to

estify?
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fonrard

and

actions?

46.

Do you promise to place no burden on Mr. Maurer to

prove innocence, but rather require the state to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt before you could convict Mr. Maurer as
charged?
47.

Iff after hearing the evidence, you came

to the conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the guilt of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found that a
majority of the jurors believed the defendant was guilty, would
you change your verdict only because you were in the minority?
48.

Are there any of you who would not give

the benefit of your own individual judgment in arriving at a
verdict in this case?
49.

Would any of you feel pressure to impose a verdict

of guilty because your family, neighbors or community expects it
of you?
50-

Ihe following questions deal with special issues

arising in this homicide case.

The lawyers want you to be honest

with your impressions and feelings.

Being a good juror may mean

also that you not sit in this case, and you can do justice to the
system by responding genuinely and openly.
(a)

Have any of you had experience with psychiatrists or

psychologists?
What is your opinion of them?
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Do j-cu thin*- they ha\ e valuable insights into human
behavior?

If not, would you be likely to disregard testimony they
might offer?
You have undoubtedly heard much publicity about cases
involving the insanity defense, or defenses of diminished mental
capacity (e.g. John Hinckley case, Dan White case).

Do you feel

that a person's mental illness should not be a defense or even
discussed in a criminal case?
(b)

What do you understand the crime of manslaughter to

be?
Do you associate it with someone "getting off"?
(c)

The State will introduce a letter written by Mr.

Maurer to the father of the victim, Janet Hannon.

The letter will

undoubtedly offend ycu and trigger an angry response within you.
Would you be able to set aside such anger and objectively
view all of the information you are given about this letter?
Would you be able to set aside such anger and objectively
view the central fact6* and legal issues in this case?
What are 2 or 3 most important aspects of being a parent?
(d)

Are there any of you who feel that parents sometimes

place too much pressure on their children to achieve?
do you think these expectations can harm children?
Do any of you think you came from a family of
"overachievers"?
-9-

If so, how
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of the family?

(e)

Do any of you disagree that people can be driven to

extreme emotional distress as a result of a relationship with a
loved one?
Have you ever witnessed others driven to violence as a
result of such a relationship?
Have you ever been in a position of comforting one who
has been left by a boyfriend or girlfriend for someone new?
Have you ever taken a sedative

or other therapeutic drug

when faced with an emotionally violitile circumstance?
(f)

Do any of you have strong feelings against the use

of drugsf particularly cocaine?
Do you belong to any groups or organizations; including
religious ones, that advocate against the use of drugs?
If so, which ones?
Have any of you ever had experience with people who use
drugs?
If so, was this in a personal or professional (including
volunteer) context?
(g)

Do any of you have strong feelings against the use

of alcohol?
How many of you do not drink?
Why not?
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ycd

r»t*aislir Itr*©*** anyone who Is an alcoholic or a

recovered alcoholic?

DATED this

V x day of November, 1985.

C-
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^XX.
NANCY BERGES01
Attorney for Defendant*-

,'JAMfiS BRADSHAW
(Attorney for Defendant
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
this /\y

day of November, 1985.
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